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The intertemporal management of irrigation water involves a consumption-storage decision, 
where the benefits of using water today are evaluated against the uncertain benefits of storing 
water for future use. Traditionally in Australia, state governments have centrally managed the 
major water storages: making decisions on water allocations given prevailing storage levels. 
However, in practice there are a number of factors which may prevent a centralised approach 
from achieving an optimal allocation of water. This paper considers in detail two decentralised 
approaches to storage management: carryover rights and capacity sharing. This paper also 
presents a quantitative analysis of storage management, involving the application of a sto-
chastic dynamic programming model.
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1  Introduction
Water storages (reservoirs) serve to reduce the variability of the supply of irrigation water. The 
management of these storages involves an intertemporal consumption-storage decision, where 
the benefits of consuming water today need to be evaluated against the uncertain benefits of 
storing water for future use. In Australia, state governments have traditionally centrally managed 
the major water storages: making decisions on water allocations (water released for consumption 
today) given prevailing storage levels. Adopted storage policies can be thought to vary along 
a yield-reliability spectrum: ranging from conservative (low yield-high reliability) to aggressive 
(high yield-low reliability). 
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In practice there are a number of factors which could prevent a centralised storage management 
policy from achieving an optimal allocation of water, including the presence of asymmetric 
information between the central manager and irrigators. Where a central manager adopts 
a sub-optimal storage management policy, this may result in reductions in mean irrigator 
incomes and potential increases in income variability. In this paper, the potential effects of sub-
optimal storage policy on irrigators are demonstrated quantitatively, via a stochastic dynamic 
programming model applied to a representative region. 
An alternative to central control of water storages is to decentralise the process by providing 
water users with some form of storage or inter-temporal transfer property right. This paper 
considers two property rights systems, carryover rights and capacity sharing. Carryover rights 
allow water users to hold over a proportion of their seasonal water allocation for use in future 
seasons. Carryover rights have, in various forms, been widely adopted within the Murray-Darling 
Basin. However, carryover rights are subject to a number of limitations.
Capacity sharing is a system of property rights to water from shared storages proposed by 
Dudley (Dudley and Musgrave 1988, Dudley and Alaouze 1989, Dudley 1990a, Dudley 1992). 
Rather than allocating users a share of total releases, each user is allocated a share of total 
storage capacity, as well as a share of inflows into and losses from the storage. Capacity sharing 
has been adopted successfully by SunWater at the St George irrigation region in southern 
Queensland and more recently in the nearby MacIntyre-Brook region. Capacity sharing has a 
number of potential advantages over standard carryover rights systems; however it remains 
largely untried outside Queensland.
The first section of this paper describes the storage management problem in detail and 
considers how a centralised approach can potentially lead to an inefficient allocation of water. 
The second section of the paper presents the results of a quantitative analysis of irrigation 
storage management, in which a stochastic dynamic optimisation model is applied to a 
representative irrigation region. The third section of the paper considers two alternatives to 
centralised storage management: carryover rights and capacity sharing.    
 
 
2  The water storage problem
The water storage problem involves a comparison of the marginal benefit of consuming water 
now with the expected marginal benefit of storing water for consumption in the future such 
that the expected net present value of welfare is maximised in the long run. While this type 
of consumption-storage problem is common in economics, the water storage problem has a 
number of unique features.
One of these unique features is the extreme variability of the supply of water. The primary source 
of this variability is climate variability: inflows into storages are the product of variable rainfall 
(particularly in Australia) and associated catchment run-off. Further, the demand for water tends 
to be inversely related to inflows and this acts to exacerbate the variability in the marginal value of 
water. For example, in dry periods, when inflows are low, farm rainfall and soil moisture are likely 
to be lower and crop water requirements higher. Another relatively unique feature of the water 
storage problem is the presence of centralised storage. While private on-farm storage of water is 
possible, it is often costly and inefficient relative to collective water storage in central dams. Capacity sharing
An optimisation problem
This section defines the water storage problem more precisely as a stochastic dynamic 
optimisation problem.  A number of economists have modelled the irrigation water storage 
problem in this way (Dudley 1998, Dudley and Hearn 1993, Beare et al. 1998, Brennan 2008, 
Alouze 1992 and Howitt et al. 2002). For a detailed review of the relevant economic literature 
see Brennan (2007). An applied example of the model is presented later in the paper. The model 
focuses on the storage problem facing a simple representative irrigation system as shown in 
figure a. 
It is assumed the irrigation system contains a single water storage, which receives stochastic 
inflows. A single storage model can be interpreted as an aggregated representation of a multiple 
storage system (see for example Perera and Codner 1988). The model also assumes there is no 
on-farm water storage and that there are no instream or tributary flows downstream of the 
storage. Irrigation water is released from the storage and transported to farms (via natural water 
courses and irrigation channels), and losses occur both in storage and in the delivery of water.
In practice, an irrigator’s demand function for water will be the result of a comprehensive 
production decision, in which the optimal use of a range of inputs (for example land, water and 
labour) is determined given prevailing input and output prices.  For the purposes of this model, 
a simple exogenous demand curve for water is assumed. In the long run, irrigators also face 
capital investment decisions. Again, for simplicity, it is assumed the capital stock and the land 
developed for irrigation is fixed. Irrigators’ capital investment decisions are considered in more 
detail in Hafi et al. (2001), Hafi et al. (2006) and Brennan (2006).
The model is formulated in discrete time. The model time periods can be thought of as water 
years (for example financial years), although theoretically the unit of time could equally be 
months or days.  Later in the paper we consider some of the practical differences between inter-
seasonal (between year) and intra-seasonal (within year) water storage decisions.
Demand for irrigation water
From equation 1, demand for irrigation water Q, by water user i, at time t, is a function of 
the price of water p and the local water state R (local rainfall and/or prevailing soil moisture). 
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The local water availability state, R, is assumed to be determined by an exogenous stochastic 
process. Water users, i, are intended to represent individual irrigators (as the owners of water 
entitlements), however this could easily be generalised to include other types of water users.
1     Where:  Qi,t = di(pt, Rt)
Q = Water demand
p = the market price of water
R = local rainfall/soil moisture
d = demand function
Supply of irrigation water
The model assumes there is a single class of water entitlement. Each irrigator has a nominal 
entitlement V and in each period the social planner announces a percentage allocation A. The 
allocation specifies the proportion of the entitlement available for consumption in the current 
period. It is also assumed that allocations can not exceed 100 per cent of entitlements. Equation 
2 is the market clearing condition which states that total allocated water (supply) must equal 
total water demand. For each irrigator, net trade can be calculated as the difference between 
final demand Q and the initial allocation in period t (equation 3). 
2       AtS vi=S,Qi,t i i
                  At£ 1
3      Ti,t=Qi,t- AtVi
Where:
A = allocation proportion 
V = nominal water entitlement
T = net trade in water
The total volume of water available in any time period, Wt, is equal to the starting water storage 
level, St-1, plus inflows, INt, less storage evaporation losses, ELt (equation 4). Inflows are assumed 
to be generated by an exogenous stochastic process. Evaporation losses (equation 5) are 
assumed to be some increasing function of the storage level. Storage evaporation losses may in 
practice depend on a range of factors, including prevailing weather conditions.  ABARE conference paper  •  09.      
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In each period t, system outflows, Out, must be less than total water availability as in equation 
6.  Outflows include allocated irrigation water plus delivery losses, plus any fixed water 
requirements (equation 7). For simplicity, transmission losses are assumed equal for all irrigators.
4     Wt=St-1+ INt- ELt
5    ELt= f (St-1)
6    Outt£ Wt
7    Outt= At( SVi)( 1 + tl) + fw
i
Where:
W = total water availability
S = volume of water in storage 
IN = inflows into storage
Out  = total water outflow 
tl  = transmission loss parameter
fw = fixed water requirements (minimum river flows, essential town water etc)
EL  = evaporation losses 
Equation 8 specifies the evolution of the water storage level over time. The volume of water held 
in storage at the end of each time period t, equals start of period storage volume plus inflows, 
less storage losses and outflows. The storage volume is constrained by the maximum storage 
capacity, SMAX, and the minimum storage level, SMIN (equation 9).
8     St= St-1+ INt - Outt - ELt
9        SMIN≤ S ≤ SMAX
 
Where:
SMAX = total storage capacity
SMIN  = minimum storage level (dead storage)       ABARE conference paper  •  09. 
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An implicit assumption in the model is that inflows and outflows occur simultaneously within 
each period. This assumption is reasonable for certain time scales; however it may become 
less realistic for longer time periods. For example, in a model with an annual time scale a large 
proportion of inflows may occur early in the period before outflows are released, potentially 
resulting in dam spills. 
The objective function
The optimisation problem involves choosing the allocation A, for each point in time and 
each state of the world, which maximises the objective function given the water availability 
constraints. The objective function is shown in equation 10 and is equal to the expected 
discounted sum of water surplus (the area under the water demand curve less the marginal cost 
of suppling water). Implicit in the objective function is the assumption that water users are risk 
neutral.
10     max  E S  btS   ∫d -1(Qi,t,Rt)dQi,t - Qi,tmc
t=1 A
•







β  = discount factor
mc = the short run marginal cost of supplying irrigation water
The model can be solved as a discrete stochastic dynamic programming problem with one 
policy variable, A, and two state variables, W and R. An applied example of the model is 
presented later in the paper.
Unused allocations
The model above implicitly assumes all allocated water is used within the period it is allocated, 
yet in practice this may not be the case. Unused allocations may occur if there are constraints 
in the delivery (or trade) of water or where the marginal benefit of water use is less than the 
marginal cost. Unused allocations are more likely to arise in wet years when the marginal value 
of water is low, and where there are restrictions on intra- or inter-regional water trade and/or 
restrictions on inter-temporal water management. Unused allocations are returned to the 
common pool and result in an increase in storage levels and an improvement in the reliability 
of water entitlements. It has been noted by Brennan (2008) that the removal of institutional 
constraints on trade may result in an increase in the utilisation of allocations, which may 
inadvertently have a detrimental effect on the reliability of water entitlements.  
Centralised storage management
In Australia, the storage management decision tends to be centrally controlled. This occurs 
through an announced allocation system, where in each season the dam manager announces 
a percentage allocation: the percentage of the nominal entitlement volume available for use 
within that season.    ABARE conference paper  •  09.      
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Consider the simplified example of an irrigation system outlined above: a single storage, 
stochastic inflows, multiple irrigators with unrestricted intra-regional trade in allocations. In order 
for a centralised storage management policy to achieve an efficient allocation of water a number 
of conditions must be met. 
First we need to assume the dam manager has perfect information. Specifically, that the dam 
manager has information on the (current and future expected) aggregate demand curve for 
water. Effectively, the dam manager needs to know the marginal value of water for each point in 
time and each water state of the world. Given this information, the dam manager would be in a 
position to develop an optimal release rule, which would specify the optimal aggregate amount 
of water to be released from the storage (the optimal allocation At ) for each point in time and 
for each water state.
Secondly, we need to assume that water (allocation) trade within the region is efficient 
and costless, that is, there are zero transaction costs. Under these assumptions, the optimal 
aggregate amount of water would be released each period and this water would then be 
efficiently allocated across irrigators via trade in water allocations. Under these conditions, the 
allocation of water across time and space would be efficient. In practice there may be a number 
of reasons why these conditions may not be met and why a centralised storage management 
policy may lead to a sub-optimal allocation of water, including asymmetric information between 
the storage manager and irrigators and the presence of transaction costs associated with water 
trade.
Asymmetric Information
In practice, it is unlikely dam managers will have complete information on irrigator water 
preferences. Dam managers may obtain approximations of aggregate water demand (current 
and expected) through observing traded prices and through discussions with representative 
irrigators. However, it is unlikely dam managers will obtain full information on aggregate water 
demand without knowing individual water demands. Irrigators are likely to have information on 
their water demands that is not available to dam managers. Further, the costs of acquiring this 
information from individual irrigators are likely to be prohibitive, particularly given significant 
heterogeneity and variability in irrigator preferences.
Irrigators may display highly heterogeneous water preferences as a result of differing crop water 
requirements (for example perennials and annuals), spatial variation (differences in soil type 
and local climate), and variation in risk preferences.  Irrigators’ water preferences may change 
over time in response to changes in relative prices of commodities, which could alter the mix of 
irrigated activities, or they could change if irrigators’ attitudes to risk change.
With asymmetric information, a central manager may implement a sub-optimal release 
(allocation) policy. For example, a central manager with incomplete information may choose to 
adopt a simple aggressive release policy, releasing all available irrigation water in each period. 
In practice, asymmetric information may affect both inter-seasonal (between years) and intra-
seasonal (within water years) storage decisions. This distinction is discussed briefly below.       ABARE conference paper  •  09. 
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Intra- and inter-seasonal storage decisions
Water allocation occurs on a ‘water year’ or irrigation season cycle. In each season, the 
announced allocation specifies the volume of water available for use. Allocations are announced 
incrementally within the season: typically the initial allocation is relatively low, before allocations 
are increased as additional inflows arrive. In the absence of any carryover rights, the dam 
manager maintains control over the inter-seasonal water storage decision. Irrigators do have 
a degree of flexibility over intra-seasonal water use/storage, since they can delay the use of 
announced allocations within the season. However, irrigators can not bring forward later season 
allocations. This can be a problem where the intra-seasonal allocation is overly conservative, that 
is, where early season allocations are low and there is unallocated water available in storage. This 
may occur in practice for a number of reasons. 
Under the current entitlement system, dam managers have to ensure enough water is available 
to deliver all allocation volumes and to cover all losses. In order to avoid reducing announced 
allocations, dam managers may hold excess water in storage early in the season to insure against 
the risk of higher than anticipated losses. Where the dam manager has imperfect information on 
water demands (especially the timing of water use within the season), uncertainty over expected 
season losses will be higher. In the short run, the intra-seasonal allocation of water may also be 
delayed by lag times in allocation announcements.
Transaction costs 
There is evidence to suggest irrigators face significant transaction costs when trading water 
allocations in the Murray-Darling Basin (see Allen Consulting 2006). Transaction costs in water 
allocation trade can include both direct financial costs, such as fees paid to water brokers and 
exchanges and application fees paid to governments, as well as non-financial costs such as time 
costs incurred by irrigators. As noted by Freebairn and Quiggin (2006), while transaction costs may 
be expected to decline as water markets ‘mature’ (and as improvements are made to property 
rights systems and associated institutions) the fundamental complexity of water rights (and of 
water as a commodity) would suggest transaction costs are likely to remain significant for the 
foreseeable future. In addition to transaction costs there also exist a range institutional constraints 
on water trade, although these less commonly apply to intra-regional temporary trade (trade in 
allocations within a region), see (Goesch et al. 2006, Goesch et al. 2008 or Peterson et al. 2004).
 Under a simple announced allocation system (with 
a single class of entitlement), substantial temporary 
trade in water allocations may be required to 
achieve an efficient allocation of available water 
across irrigators (Freebairn and Quiggin 2006). This 
can be illustrated with a simple example as shown 
in figure b. In this example there are two irrigators; 
irrigator A has an elastic demand curve for water 
(for example annual crops) while irrigator B has 
an inelastic demand curve (for example perennial 
crops). PW represents the market price of water in 
a ‘wet’ year while PD is the higher market price of 
water during a ‘dry’ year. For simplicity it is assumed 
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From the diagram it can be seen that irrigator B demands a similar amount of water in each state, 
irrigator A’s demand varies significantly between states. Under a simple announced allocation 
system, substantial temporary trade will need to occur to generate an efficient allocation of 
water. If both irrigators have identical water entitlements, irrigator B will buy water from irrigator 
A in a dry year, while in a wet year irrigator A will buy water from irrigator B.  Any system of 
water property rights which better aligns entitlement reliability levels with irrigator reliability 
preferences will tend to reduce the need for temporary water trade and reduce irrigators’ 
exposure to associated transaction costs.  One approach is to define different classes of water 
entitlements with distinct reliability levels (that is, high and low reliability entitlements).
High and low reliability entitlements 
High and low reliability entitlement systems are relatively common in the Murray-Darling Basin. 
High and low reliability entitlement systems have the potential to reduce temporary water trade 
requirements by providing water rights which more closely match the reliability preferences of 
individual irrigators (see Freebairn and Quiggin 2006). However, a two reliability level approach 
has a number of limitations. Under this system, irrigators will need to hold a mix of the two 
entitlement classes in order achieve a specific reliability level. This may involve some additional 
cost for irrigators, particularly where there are transaction costs associated with permanent 
trade. Such a system also places an artificial upper and lower bound on available reliability levels. 
Under a high and low reliability system there is a need to ensure the mix of high and low 
reliability entitlements in the system at any point in time is appropriate. Freebairn and Quiggin 
(2006) consider a system where the water authority takes an active role in the market for water 
entitlements to ensure the optimal mix of high and low reliability entitlements is achieved. 
Such a system would use market preferences for high and low reliability entitlements to reveal 
information about the aggregate reliability preference in a region. There are, however, obvious 
costs associated with a water authority taking such an active role, including the transaction 
costs of engaging in the market as well as additional administrative effort and regulatory 
requirements. In addition, there are likely to be difficulties in determining the appropriate 
conversion ratios between high and low entitlements.
Implications for investment
In the model and discussion above it has been assumed the irrigation capital stock is fixed. In 
the model we have assumed irrigators can not make any additional investments to increase 
the area set up for irrigation or to change irrigation activities. In practice, it is likely there will be 
significant interdependence between storage management polices and irrigator investment 
decisions.  For example, Dudley (1988) develops a model where total area irrigated and storage 
policies are jointly determined by a single decision maker. Brennan (2006) presents a model 
where the proportion of available irrigation land devoted to three activities (horticulture, dairy 
and broadacre) is a function of the yield and reliability of water entitlements.
In the long run, a fixed centralised storage policy may act as a constraint on irrigator investment, 
for example preventing an optimal distribution of low and high flexibility irrigation activities. 
Where a fixed aggressive storage policy is adopted this may constrain investment in more 
intensive forms of agriculture which require more reliable water supply. A potential example of 
this would be the significantly greater proportion of horticultural activity in Victorian irrigation 
systems relative to NSW systems where the storage policy is significantly more aggressive. 10       ABARE conference paper  •  09. 
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3  Model case study
In this section the optimisation model developed earlier is applied to a case study region 
to demonstrate the potential benefits of improvements in storage policy. The case study is 
based on the Murrumbidgee region in NSW. The choice of the Murrumbidgee region is one of 
convenience and it is intended that the results be sufficiently general. 
The Murrumbidgee region is a relatively complicated water supply system with two major 
storages, the Blowering and Burrinjuck dams, and a connection to the Snowy Mountains 
hydroelectric scheme. The modelling in this study abstracts from these complexities and 
makes the simplifying assumption of a single storage.  For a detailed representation of the 
Murrumbidgee system, with multiple storages and constraints in delivery capacity, see the 
model of Beare et al. (1998). A detailed discussion of model assumptions and solution procedures 
is contained in appendix A. Model parameters have been estimated econometrically using 
empirical data or drawn from econometric literature where possible.  
Results
Two distinct storage policies are evaluated in this case study: a base case policy representative of 
a sub-optimal ‘aggressive’ storage policy, and an optimal storage policy. The base case storage 
policy assumes all available irrigation water (water in excess of basic environmental and town 
water requirements) is allocated up to a maximum allocation of 100 per cent in any given water 
year. With such a rule, inter-year storage reserves occur only when water availability exceeds 100 
per cent of entitlement volumes. This rule implicitly assumes there are no unused allocations 
and no reserves are held for high security entitlements. This rule can be considered a reasonable 
approximation of the typical centralised policy adopted in NSW irrigation systems, see Hughes et 
al. (2009). 
The optimal policy represents the release policy that would be adopted by a central planner 
with full information. The optimal policy can also be interpreted as the aggregate release policy 
that would result under an effective decentralised system of storage management, such as 
carryover rights or capacity sharing (discussed in detail later in the paper). The difference in 
welfare (as measured by mean water surplus) between the two polices represents the potential 
gains from improving storage management policy in the presence of information asymmetry. 
However, the model excludes a number of other potential benefits of improved storage 
management, such as a reduction in reliance on temporary trade (and associated transaction 
costs) and removal of constraints on investment.
It is important to note the estimated optimal release policy should not be interpreted literally as 
the optimal policy to be applied in the Murrumbidgee region. Clearly if there is an information 
problem preventing the dam manager from estimating the optimal policy (as we propose), the 
same information problem would prevent any researchers from estimating it.   ABARE conference paper  •  09.      11
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Policy functions
The base case policy function and the estimated optimal policy function (the allocation or 
release rule) are shown in figure c. 
These policy functions specify the allocation of water as a function of the state of the world: the 
level of water availability and local rainfall. For very high and very low levels of water availability, 
the optimal policy and the base case policy converge. In between these extremes, the optimal 
policy allocates less water and holds more water in storage.
Simulation results
Given the estimated policy function, Monte Carlo simulations can be performed and probability 
distributions over key variables generated. Tables 1, 2 and 3 contain the simulation results for key 
model variables, including the mean value, standard deviation (S.D.) and coefficient of variation 
(C.V.). The model assumes there are two irrigators, with irrigator 1 being representative of 
broadacre / general security entitlement holders and irrigator 2 being representative horticulture 
/ high security entitlement holders.  
The optimal storage policy results in a small reduction in mean water allocations (–0.6%) and 
mean water use (irrigator 1: –0.8%, irrigator 2: +0.2%) relative to the base case policy, and a 
substantial increase in the mean (end of year) storage level (from 14 per cent to 33 per cent). 
Overall, the optimal policy results in an 11.8 per cent increase in mean irrigator water surplus 
relative to the base case.
The optimal policy has an even greater effect on the variability of water use and water prices. 
The variability of water use (as measured by the coefficient of variation) is reduced by 26.5% for 
irrigator 1 and by 28.7% for irrigator 2, while the variability in the objective value is reduced 63.6 
per cent. A key feature of the optimal policy is its ability to use storage to reduce the variability 
of water supply. While the model doesn’t explicitly account for the risk preferences of irrigators, if 
irrigators are risk averse they will value a reduction in the variability of water supply. 
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Overall, the modelling results here are consistent with similar studies undertaken by Brennan 
(2008) and Dudley (1988) in that a sub-optimal release policy results in a relatively small 
reduction in mean incomes and a substantial increase in the variability of incomes. 
Figures d and e display histograms for water demand/use for the two representative irrigators 
under the base case and optimal policies.  
These figures demonstrate how the differences in water preferences between the two irrigators 
result in different water use patterns given variability in water supply. Irrigator 1 (broadacre) 
displays relatively variable water use relative to irrigator 2 (horticulture). Figures d and e also 
demonstrate the effect of the optimal release policy on the variability of water use. For both 
irrigators, the optimal policy results in a lower probability of a 100 per cent allocation, in 
exchange for a lower probability of low allocations relative to the base case. 
1
  Simulation results, base policy rule 
    units  mean  S.D.  C.V
Allocation, A  %  82.8  20.86  0.25
Price, P  $ / ML  65.7  257.0  3.91
Storage level, S  %  14.0  21.8  1.55
Evaporation Loss, EL  GL  66.9  16.4  0.24
Water Demand/Use, Qi   
– Irrigator i = 1  GL  1 662.4  444.3  0.27
– Irrigator i = 2   GL  250.0  37.5  0.15
Objective Value  $ Million  353.8  132.9  0.38
2
  Simulation results, optimal policy rule 
    units  mean  S.D.  C.V
Allocation, A  %  82.3  15.2  0.18
Price, P  $ / ML  55.1  114.0  2.07
Storage level, S  %  33.0  25.0  0.76
Evaporation Loss, EL  GL  74.8  16.6  0.22
Water Demand/Use, Qi   
– Irrigator i = 1  GL  1 649.7  324.1  0.20
– Irrigator i = 2   GL  250.4  26.8  0.11
Objective Value  $ Million  395.5  54.6  0.14
3
  Simulation results, deviation from base 
    units  mean  S.D.  C.V.
Allocation, A  %  –0.6  –27.2  –26.7
Price, P  %  –16.3  –55.6  –47.0
Storage level, S  %  134.8  14.7  –51.2
Evaporation Loss, EL  %  11.8  1.6  –9.2
Water Demand/Use, Qi   
– Irrigator i = 1  %  –0.8  –27.1  –26.5
– Irrigator i = 2   %  0.2  –28.6  –28.7
Objective Value  %  11.8  –58.9  –63.3  ABARE conference paper  •  09.      1
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It should be noted that the model assumes the existence of a single class of water entitlement 
and that any differences in the reliability of water use between irrigator 1 and irrigator 2 occur 
as a result of temporary water trade. When water allocations are reduced, irrigator 2 offsets 
the reduction by purchasing water from irrigator 1. In theory, an equivalent outcome could be 
achieved if the dam manager, knowing the preferences of individual irrigators, constructed 
separate water entitlements with appropriate reliability levels, or alternatively, where each 
irrigator owned a capacity share and managed releases according to their reliability preferences. 
Sensitivity analysis
The inflow and rainfall distribution used in this model was estimated based on historical data. 
As such, it may overestimate future water availability levels given the potential effects of climate 
change. Further, the Murrumbidgee irrigation region has tended to receive reasonably reliable 
inflows (relative to many other irrigation systems in the Murray-Darling Basin). For these reasons 
it is useful to consider how the model results change when water availability is reduced. A 
sensitivity analysis was performed to estimate the effect of reduced rainfall and inflows on 
model results. In each of the scenarios the joint rainfall and inflow probability distribution 
is altered such that mean inflows and rainfall are reduced in a fixed ratio of 3:1 (3 per cent 
reduction in inflows for every 1 per cent reduction in rainfall), to capture the fact that reductions 
in rainfall are expected to be associated with more than proportional reductions in run-off (see 
Adamson et al. 2007). 
The scenarios therefore assume both an increasing probability of low rainfall conditions and 
lower mean inflows associated with each rainfall state. Each scenario captures both a reduction 
in irrigation water availability and an increase in irrigation water demand because of a reduction 
in local rainfall. The results of this sensitivity analysis are shown in tables 4 and 5.
As expected, reductions in mean rainfall and inflows result in reductions in mean objective 
values and increases in mean water prices for both the optimal and base case simulations. The 
important point to note here is that the benefits of adopting the optimal storage policy over the 
base case policy increase as water availability is reduced.  That is, as water availability is reduced 
Water use as percentage of 
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the gain in mean welfare (mean objective) and reduction in income variability (S.D of objective) 
associated with the optimal policy increases.
The model results confirm that with greater water scarcity there is more to be gained by 
improving the management of irrigation water storages. Where inflows are frequently high, 
storages are likely to be full or near full most of the time and there may be little scope to 
improve outcomes by holding any more water in storage. When inflows are lower and less 
reliable, there is more to be gained by holding water in storage to insure against drought 
conditions. This is an important result given predictions of reduced water availability across 




  Sensitivity analysis, reduction in inflow/rainfall, mean effects  
    units  scenario
Rainfall Mean  % change  Basecase  –5  –10  –15
    mm  406.6  386.3  365.9  345.6
Inflow Mean   % change  0  –15  –30  –45
    GL  2 704  2 301  1 898  1 491
     
Base Case     
– Mean Price  $/ML  65.7  115.3  243.0  555.4
– Mean Objective  $ Million  354  315  273  206
     
Optimal Policy     
– Mean Price  $/ML  55.1  69.3  89.1  128.1
– Mean Objective   $ Million  395  382  362  332
     
Deviation     
– Mean Price  % change  –16.3  –39.9  –63.3  –76.9
– Mean Objective  % change  11.8  21.2  32.6  61.8
5
  Sensitivity analysis  reduction in inflow/rainfall, variance effects  
    units  scenario
     
Rainfall Mean  % change  Basecase  –5  –10  –15
    mm  406.6  386.3  365.9  345.6
Inflow Mean   % change  0  –15  –30  –45
    GL  2 704  2 301  1 898  1 491
     
Base Case     
– S.D. Price  $/ML  257.0  528.4  978.1  1620.6
– S.D. Objective  $ Million  133  161  202  279
     
Optimal Policy     
– S.D. Price  $/ML  114.0  179.2  199.5  266.6
– S.D. Objective  $ Million  55  45  44  52
     
Deviation     
– S.D. Price  % change  –55.6  –66.1  –79.6  –83.5
– S.D. Objective  % change  –58.9  –71.8  –78.3  –81.3  ABARE conference paper  •  09.      1
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4  Carryover rights and capacity     
  sharing
An alternative to centralised storage management is to decentralise the process by designing 
some system of property rights allowing individual irrigators to exercise a degree of control over 
storage decisions. In this paper, two specific decentralised approaches to storage management 
are considered: carryover rights and capacity sharing. A decentralised approach to storage 
management may help to address some of the problems of centralised storage management 
outlined earlier in the paper including asymmetric information and transaction costs in water 
trade.  
A decentralised approach to storage management allows irrigators to make their own storage 
decisions, taking into account their private information on water needs. In the presence 
of asymmetric information between irrigators and dam managers, decentralised storage 
management may result in releases from storage more closely aligning with the preferences 
of irrigators, which could potentially increase returns to irrigators in the long run. Further, by 
making their own storage decisions irrigators can effectively influence the reliability of their 
entitlement such that it better matches their preferences. More closely aligning individual 
water entitlements with reliability preferences will reduce the volume of temporary water trade 
required and reduce transaction costs associated with trade. 
Carryover rights
Carryover rights can be more precisely defined as inter-seasonal transfer rights: the right to 
transfer allocations between seasons. Specifically, a carryover right allows each water user 
to hold over a proportion of their current season’s water allocation for use in future seasons. 
Without carryover provisions, any unused allocations are returned to the common pool and 
shared among water users in future periods. Carryover rights have been in place in many 
New South Wales and Queensland irrigation systems for some time and have recently been 
introduced into a number of Victorian and South Australian systems. 
Introducing carryover provisions allows irrigators to make storage decisions according to their 
specific preferences. Carryover rights may help irrigators overcome some of the problems 
associated with central storage management such as asymmetric information and transaction 
costs associated with trade. Carryover is, however, an incomplete property right since it does not 
explicitly define rights to dam capacity (or to storage losses), and as such does not ensure dam 
capacity is rationed efficiently.
Carryover rights are subject to exclusivity problems: carryover decisions have external impacts 
which influence other users of the same storage.  Carryover water consumes scarce storage 
space and contributes to storage losses either through evaporation or through storage spills.  
Under an announced allocation system, these external effects are socialised across all irrigators 
in the system. For example, when water is carried over, no adjustments are made for associated 
increases in storage losses: effectively any increase in storage loss is socialised, such that those 
who do not carry over water are adversely affected by those who do.1       ABARE conference paper  •  09. 
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In practice, carryover provisions often have a number of restrictions imposed on their use. For 
example, there may be limits on the amount of water that can be carried over in any season. 
Carryover rights may not be perpetual in that water can be carried over from one season to the 
next but not necessarily held over indefinitely. The motivation for placing such restrictions on 
carryover may be to limit the potential for external impacts. However, where these restrictions 
are binding they can prevent a more efficient intertemporal allocation of water being achieved. 
Access to carryover over water may also be subject to sovereign risk as has been demonstrated 
in a number of recent instances where irrigators have been denied access to carryover water 
during drought periods.
Continuous accounting
Standard carryover rights operate on a seasonal (water year) time scale. Continuous accounting 
is a form of carryover where users’ accounts are updated on a more frequent (generally daily) 
time scale.  With continuous accounting, any water not used in each time period automatically 
caries over to the next period (day). Each user has a single water balance such that there is no 
distinction made between ‘carryover water’ and water allocations. As of 2005-06, the Border 
Rivers, Gwydir and Namoi regions in NSW had implemented continuous accounting (MDBC 
2007). 
Continuous accounting can in some respects be considered a compromise between standard 
carryover rights and capacity sharing. For example, under continuous accounting, limits are 
generally placed on the volume of water each user can accrue rather than on the proportion 
of allocations which can be carried over. These limits could potentially be based on a share of 
available storage capacity. However, even where this occurs, there are significant differences 
between continuous accounting and capacity sharing. Most notably, continuous accounting 
carryover still involves centralised allocation announcements and does not redefine water rights 
at the source. 
Capacity sharing
The basics
Capacity sharing is a system of allocating property rights to water from shared storages 
proposed by Dudley (Dudley and Musgrave 1988). Capacity sharing involves redefining water 
entitlements into separate storage space rights and water/inflow rights. Each entitlement holder 
in an irrigation system is allocated a share of the total system storage capacity, as well as a share 
of total inflows (and losses). Users are able to manage these capacity shares independently: 
determining how much water to use (or sell) and how much to leave in their share of storage. 
Users in effect have their own water account which receives stochastic deposits (inflows) which 
can be withdrawn (released) as the user requires. 
Capacity sharing results in water entitlements which more closely reflect the physical realities 
of the water supply system: constrained storage capacity, variable water inflows and significant 
storage and delivery losses. Capacity sharing ensures that storage space is efficiently rationed 
and external effects are minimised, by ensuring losses are internalised. Unlike carryover rights, 
capacity sharing completely replaces the traditional announced allocation system. The dam 
manager no longer needs to make allocation announcements and their role becomes one of   ABARE conference paper  •  09.      1
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water accounting: recording each user’s inflows and withdrawals to monitor the quantity of 
water in each user’s account. 
Under capacity sharing, trade in water involves withdrawing water from the seller’s account 
and depositing it into the buyer’s account. This is equivalent to temporary water trade or trade 
in allocations under an announced allocation system. In contrast, trade in permanent water 
involves trade in storage space rights and inflow rights.  Queensland water authority SunWater 
has successfully introduced capacity sharing into two of their irrigation systems in southern 
Queensland (St George and MacIntyre Brook). The capacity sharing schemes at St George and 
MacIntyre Brook are the subject of ongoing ABARE research (Hughes et al. 2009).
While capacity sharing minimises external effects relative to carryover rights, it does not result in 
perfectly independent water entitlements. In particular, there is the issue of ‘internal spills’.
Internal Spills
Internal spills occur when an individual capacity share becomes full and receives surplus inflows 
(while other users’ shares are less than full), necessitating the reallocation of surplus water to 
other water users. Where there exists an efficient market in water (temporary trade), any method 
of reallocating this water (for example arbitrary reallocation or some form of auctioning) will 
result in an efficient allocation of surplus water across users. Given well-specified property 
rights (to storage and water), internal spills will not prevent an optimal allocation of water being 
achieved in the short run. However, internal spills may be a problem if they are frequent and 
large such that individual irrigator inflows become significantly dependent on the actions of 
other irrigators.
In practice, internal spills are likely to occur infrequently, since capacity share holders will have 
an incentive to use or sell water (or to purchase additional storage space) whenever there is a 
significant probability of an internal spill occurring. For example, where the volume of water in 
an individual’s capacity share is high and/or there is a significant expectation of a high inflow 
event. In systems where users have accurate up-to-date information on capacity share volumes 
and expected inflows, and where the transaction costs of withdrawing water or selling water (or 
purchasing additional storage space) are low, internal spills should be relatively rare. 
Storage losses
Another complication with capacity sharing is the allocation of storage losses, the main 
component of which is evaporation losses. Evaporation losses are a function of the surface area 
of the storage and prevailing weather conditions. Given that dam banks are sloped, surface area 
varies significantly as the volume of water in the dam changes. In order to maintain exclusivity, 
storage losses allocated to individual users should be calculated as a function of their capacity 
share volume, such that users with more water in storage are exposed to a higher proportion of 
total storage losses. Ideally, evaporation losses should be shared such that each user is exposed 
to their marginal contribution to total evaporation loses. Under certain conditions, this can be 
approximated by allocating total evaporation losses in proportion to the volume of water in 
each user’s capacity share (Hughes et al. 2009).1       ABARE conference paper  •  09. 
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Additional benefits
There are a number of benefits associated with capacity sharing in addition to those mentioned 
above. One of these additional benefits is reduced regulatory uncertainty faced by irrigators. 
Under a standard announced allocation system, irrigators are exposed to regulatory or 
government uncertainty, since the potential yield and reliability of water entitlements are 
dependent to some extent on the policies of dam managers. For instance, the allocation rules 
used by central authorities may be complex and subject to a degree of discretion, making it 
difficult for irrigators to predict announced allocations. Furthermore, uncertainty may surround 
the allocation rules themselves, given they may be altered over time and in response to different 
sets of circumstances. 
Under a capacity sharing system, the yield and reliability of any given water entitlement depends 
only on irrigator water use/storage decisions and the hydrology of the water supply system. 
This reduced uncertainty may make it easier for irrigators to compare the yield and reliability of 
water entitlements across different regions and may assist irrigators in making their own forward 
planning decisions, including crop choice, planting area and capital investment decisions. 
Another potential benefit of capacity sharing is that it defines rights to water at the source, 
i.e. the point of storage. Defining water rights at the source (or ‘source tagging’) can improve 
the efficiency of water allocation in a number of ways including: internalising delivery losses, 
facilitating unbundling of water rights (including separate rights to delivery capacity) and 
addressing third party effects of inter system water trade in connected river systems Heaney et 
al. (2006).
In most irrigation systems, water is transported significant distances through natural water 
courses and irrigation channels, which can be subject to significant delivery losses including 
evaporation and seepage. A proportion of these delivery losses may be flow dependent (Heaney 
et al. 2006), such that total delivery losses will vary depending on the volume of water ordered 
by irrigators, the timing of water orders within the year and the location of water use. When 
delivery losses are internalised there will be incentives to trade water into locations with lower 
delivery losses or to time releases to occur during periods when delivery losses are lower.
Where water rights are defined at the point of the farm, third party effects (in terms of the 
reliability / yield of entitlements) can arise when trading water in connected river systems, 
particularly where water entitlements are traded upstream of a tributary (Heaney et al. 2006). 
Under a capacity sharing system, the yield and reliability of water entitlements is tied to the 
system of origin and such effects are limited. 
Another potential problem that can arise with an announced allocation system is insider trading. 
There may be incentives for insider trading to occur when individuals obtain information about 
allocation decisions prior to their announcement. With capacity sharing, no central allocation 
decisions are required, reducing the potential for insider trading.
Other Issues
Most irrigation water storages also provide water for uses other than irrigation, including urban, 
stock and domestic and environmental water use. Under capacity sharing, these other water 
uses could be allocated separate capacity shares which they could then manage independently   ABARE conference paper  •  09.      19
Capacity sharing
(Dudley and Musgrave 1988). Such a system would also facilitate trading between irrigation, 
urban and environmental water users. Capacity sharing may be particularly beneficial to 
environmental water managers, whose role is likely to increase in significance in the future. 
The adoption of capacity sharing is likely to involve substantial set up costs. However, once 
in place, the operating costs are likely to be relatively low. In fact the operating costs may 
potentially be lower than those incurred under traditional announced allocation systems as has 
been the case for SunWater at St George (SunWater 2008). Some of the initial costs incurred in 
setting up a capacity sharing system would include the costs of developing a computer based 
accounting system, educating and consulting with irrigators, and making required changes to 
regulations. 
One potential constraint to the introduction of capacity sharing may be irrigator concerns 
surrounding the entitlement conversion process. There may be resistance from irrigators if it is 
perceived some entitlement holders are going to be potentially worse off (and others better 
off) after the transition. While an efficient allocation of storage capacity and inflow shares will 
be achieved regardless of the initial allocation (so long as there exists an efficient secondary 
market), from a practical perspective these distributional issues are important. 
The analysis in this paper has focused on a simple representative water supply system involving 
a single major water storage. In practice there can exist a range of more complicated water 
supply systems, with multiple storages and multiple connected rivers.  While implementing 
capacity sharing may be more challenging in complex water supply systems, capacity sharing 
should not be viewed as a method which is only suited to simple systems. For example, there 
are a number of options for dealing with multiple storages including defining separate rights 
to each storage, or defining rights to combined system storage capacity (Dudley 1990b). The 
implementation of capacity sharing in more complex water supply systems is not considered in 




This paper has outlined, in the context of a simple model, a number of reasons why a centralised 
storage management approach may result in an inefficient allocation of water resources, 
including asymmetric information and transaction costs in water trade. Clearly it is unlikely in 
practice that central managers will be able to obtain full information on the water preferences 
of irrigators. In the presence of such asymmetric information, central dam managers may adopt 
a sub-optimal storage (release) policy. Further, under a centralised storage management policy, 
a substantial amount of seasonal water trade may be required to achieve an efficient allocation 
of water across different irrigators. Where there are significant transaction costs in water trade, a 
water property rights system which reduces this trade requirement will be welfare enhancing.
The simple optimisation model developed in this paper was applied to a case study region in 
order to demonstrate quantitatively the potential effects of sub-optimal storage policy on the 
incomes of irrigators. Using the model, a representative aggressive storage policy was compared 0       ABARE conference paper  •  09. 
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with an estimated optimal storage policy. The model demonstrated the ability of optimal 
storage policy to generate both increased mean incomes and reduced variability of incomes. 
Given reasonable parameter value assumptions, the model estimated an increase in mean 
surplus to irrigators of 11.8 per cent and a reduction in the variability of surplus of more than 
66 per cent. The model also demonstrated that the gains from optimal storage management 
(both in terms of mean and variability of incomes) increase substantially as the level of water 
availability reduces. 
An alternative to centralised storage management is to decentralise the process, by introducing 
property rights allowing irrigators to make independent storage decisions. A decentralised 
approach has the potential to overcome some of the problems of centralised management such 
as asymmetric information and transaction costs in water trade. Two decentralised approaches 
to storage management are considered in this paper: carryover rights and capacity sharing.
Carryover rights have been adopted, in varying forms, in the majority of irrigation systems in 
the Murray-Darling Basin. However, carryover rights are an incomplete solution, since they do 
not define explicit property rights to storage capacity or to losses associated with storage. As a 
result, carryover rights generate external effects, where individual irrigator carryover decisions 
affect other irrigators in the system. In an attempt to minimise these external effects, significant 
restrictions are often placed upon carryover rights which further weaken their effectiveness. 
Capacity sharing is a property rights system proposed by Dudley (Dudley and Musgrave 1988), 
involving redefining water entitlements into separate storage capacity rights and water/inflow 
rights. Unlike carryover rights, capacity sharing ensures storage space is efficiently rationed and 
losses are internalised. Capacity sharing has a number of other potential benefits relative to 
systems of carryover rights including: defining water rights at the source rather than at the farm 
and replacing the traditional announced allocation system. 
The concept of capacity sharing is considered, both by Dudley (Dudley and Musgrave 1988) 
and in this paper, within the context of relatively simple water supply system (where all water 
is sourced from a single storage). While there may exist some concern about the suitability of 
capacity sharing in more complex systems, it is not obvious the concept could not be sufficiently 
generalised. The ability for the capacity sharing framework to be applied to a range of more 
complex water supply systems remains a subject for potential future research. 
In many cases, centralised storage management polices implemented by state governments 
may not be in alignment with the overall water preferences of irrigators. While carryover rights 
have been introduced to help address this problem, these are subject to significant limitations. 
Further, the announced allocation framework adds an unnecessary layer of complexity and 
uncertainty to irrigator water entitlements. It is clear there exists significant scope to improve 
the management of irrigation water storages. Capacity sharing is a promising approach which 
deserves further consideration by policy makers.
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Appendix  Model assumptions
Unit of time
The model time unit is the financial year, encompassing the irrigation season which typically 
operates between August and May. As such, the model focuses on inter-seasonal rather than 
intra-seasonal water allocation. This large time unit simplifies the modelling and overcomes 
a number of data limitations.  However, an annual time scale prevents the model from 
representing the significant intra-seasonal variability typically observed in both the supply and 
demand for water. 
Supply of Water
A normal distribution is fitted to approximately 100 years of historical local rainfall data (the 
average of annual rainfall at Griffith and Leeton).  Data was obtained on historical combined 
annual storage inflows (Blowering and Burrinjuck) between 1975 and 2007, from the NSW 
Department of Water and Energy (2006) PINNEENA database. A conditional inflow distribution 
was estimated via a simple linear OLS regression of inflows against rainfall between 1975 
and 2007, such that the mean of the inflow distribution is a linear function of rainfall and the 
standard deviation is constant. The estimated rainfall and inflow distribution parameters are 
shown in table 7, along with other supply parameter assumptions. The marginal delivery cost of 
water is set with reference to irrigation water marginal usage charges (see IPART 2006).
The fixed water requirement includes town water and basic environmental water. Estimates for 
these flow amounts are based on observed historical allocations for town, stock and domestic 
and other water requirements as well as deviations between recorded outflows and irrigation 
water use. It is also assumed that the fixed water requirement (town, stock and domestic, and 
minimum environmental water) is provided whenever sufficient water is available. That is, the 
fixed requirement takes priority over irrigation water demands.
6
  Model case study supply side parameter assumptions  
description  parameter  units  value
Conditional Inflow mean  INμ  MLs  265 760 + 5 930Rt
Conditional Inflow SD  INσ  MLs  670 683
Rainfall mean  Rμ  Mm  406.6
Inflow SD  Rσ  Mm  109.8
Storage capacity   SMAX  MLs  2 657 410
Minimum storage level   SMIN  MLs  27 240
Delivery cost  Mc  $ per ML  5
Conveyance loss   L  %  25
Town, Stock and Domestic water   F  MLs  100 000
Basic environmental Water    MLs  150 000       ABARE conference paper  •  09. 
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An evaporation loss function was developed, using historical time series data on mean annual 
storage levels and mean annual pan evaporation and relationships between surface area and 
storage volume for each of the two dams obtained from the PINEENA database. The resulting 
function specifies total annual evaporation as a function of the start of year storage level and the 
annual inflow volume.  
Given an annual timescale, the model may potentially underestimate dam spills in cases where 
a large proportion of seasonal inflows occur early in the season prior to any outflows occurring. 
One way of overcoming this problem would be to estimate seasonal spills from historical data 
similar to the approach of Brennan (2008). However, the lack of an adequate time series of dam 
spill data has prevented this approach being adopted here.  
Demand for Water
The demand side of the model assumes two irrigators, one representative of broadacre / general 
security entitlement holders, another representative of horticulture / high security entitlement 
holders.  Each irrigator’s demand for water is assumed to be a function of price and local rainfall. 
Nested constant elasticity functions are used to capture the effect of local rainfall and price on 
demand for irrigation water. Price elasticities and rainfall elasticities for irrigation water have been 
set in the model with reference to a review of available econometric literature, (for example, 
Brennan 2006, Bell et al. 2007, Bjornlund and Rossini 2005 and Wheeler et al. 2008). For a detailed 
discussion of this literature see Hughes et al. (2009). 
In a full allocation year it is assumed each irrigator demands a water allocation equal to their 
nominal entitlement. The market price of water in a full allocation year is set to a specific value 
based on observation of historical data in the region.
It is assumed horticulture water demand becomes perfectly inelastic once a threshold level is 
reached, beyond which permanent horticulture plantings may die because of lack of water. In 
reality, crop destruction occurs incrementally as the oldest, less valuable, tress will be allowed 
to die first, while water is allocated to the most valuable trees. The assumption of a perfectly 
inelastic demand curve at a fixed point is a simple method of capturing the basic effect of 
extreme water scarcity on horticultural agriculture. In the event water availability is low enough 
that the minimum threshold level of water for horticulture is not available, the model imposes a 
penalty representing the Net Present Value (NPV) cost of horticultural crop destruction based on 
unpublished ABARE estimates for the Murrumbidgee region. 
7
  Model case study demand side parameter assumptions  
description  parameter  units  value
Water entitlement (Irrigator 1)  E1  MLs  2 029 360
Water entitlement (Irrigator 2)  E2  MLs  279 000
Price elasticity of demand (Irrigator 1)   α1    –1.0
Price elasticity of demand (Irrigator 2)  α2    –0.5
Price of water (when A = 1 and R = mean)  P*  $  40
Rain elasticity of demand (for both irrigators)  φ    –0.2
Irrigator 2 (horticulture) minimum water threshold  Q2
Min    0.4  ABARE conference paper  •  09.      
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